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Abstract
Deepfakes, one of the most novel forms of misinformation, have become a real challenge in the communicative environ-
ment due to their spread through online news and social media spaces. Although fake news have existed for centuries, its
circulation is now more harmful than ever before, thanks to the ease of its production and dissemination. At this juncture,
technological development has led to the emergence of deepfakes, doctored videos, audios or photos that use artificial
intelligence. Since its inception in 2017, the tools and algorithms that enable the modification of faces and sounds in
audiovisual content have evolved to the point where there are mobile apps and web services that allow average users its
manipulation. This research tries to show how three renowned media outlets—The Wall Street Journal, The Washington
Post, and Reuters—and three of the biggest Internet-based companies—Google, Facebook, and Twitter—are dealing with
the spread of this new form of fake news. Results show that identification of deepfakes is a common practice for both types
of organizations. However, while the media is focused on training journalists for its detection, online platforms tended to
fund research projects whose objective is to develop or improve media forensics tools.
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1. Introduction
The implementation of artificial intelligence in techno-
logically mediated communicative processes in the net-
worked society poses new challenges for journalistic veri-
fication. Simultaneously, it has enhanced different stages
of news production systems. The effects of the technol-
ogy that houses artificial intelligence are present both in
the communicative flows and in a large part of the social-
ization dynamics. Hence, the threat introduced by the
emergence of deepfakes, doctored videos by using artifi-
cial intelligence, arises as one of the most recent hazards
for journalistic quality and news credibility. Although
deepfakes are not only a concern for journalism, their
existence has raised the uncertainty among users when
trying to access news content. Likewise, the increasing
sophistication of this form of fake news has put profes-
sionals on alert (Vaccari & Chadwick, 2020).
Misinformation has increased its relevance over the
last few years, having now a major significance in the
public agenda (Vargo, Guo, & Amazeen, 2018). In con-
sequence, the number of projects and measures for
counteracting this phenomenon has grown consider-
ably. Example of this could be the Action Plan Against
Disinformation developed by the European Commission
(2018). Media and journalists are aware about how the
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success of hoaxes undermines democracy and its relia-
bility (Geham, 2017). Therefore, they try to react with
actions that facilitate transparency and the fulfilment
of their professional and ethical rules, like fact checking
(Lowrey, 2017). This is an issue on which different lines
of thinking have been opened. All of them try to counter-
balance the result of misinformative political and social
trends that became significative in 21st century societies
(McNair, 2017) in a context where social media plays a
central role as a space for the generation and dissemina-
tion of fake news and the consequences that this entails
(Nelson & Taneja, 2018).
Techniques that guarantee the information verifica-
tion’s efficiency—one of the core elements of journal-
ism since its consolidation as a communicative technique
in the modern age (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2014)—are
looking inside technological innovation for tools with
the ability to support professionals in their daily tasks.
It is true that the norms followed for producing accu-
rate informative pieces are in some cases unclear and
nuanced (Shapiro, Brin, Bédard-Brûlé, & Mychajlowycz,
2013). Nonetheless, journalism should not retain anti-
quated verification techniques, but should rather update
them to computational methods in order to evaluate
dubious information (Ciampaglia et al., 2015). There
are currently revamped verification systems with fact-
checking techniques. Those may contribute to the elab-
oration of news pieces that, after the application of a
complex group of cultural, structural, and technological
relations would show the legitimation of news in the dig-
ital age (Carlson, 2017, p. 13). Although a high level of
mistrust remains, some techniques used in these infor-
mation verification services are able to build a bigger
reliance by the users (Brandtzaeg & Følstad, 2017).
Furthermore, this scenario has seen the emergence
of new proposals for renewed professional practices and
profiles (Palomo & Masip, 2020). This could be the case
of constructive journalism, whose objective is regain-
ing the lost trust of the media (McIntyre & Gyldensted,
2017). This is a journalistic movement that explores new
paths. However, it will take time to see if these new
approaches fit in the frame of emerging journalism in the
Third Millennium, with a clear commitment to social ser-
vice, transparency and accuracy.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Misinformation Through the Ages
Falsehood, fantasy and fake news have walked along
with the development of communication and journalism,
initiating discussions about its practice and its role in soci-
ety (McNair, 2017). Although there are evidence of misin-
formation since the Roman Empire (Burkhardt, 2017), its
major development took place with the invention of the
print in the 15th century. The possibility of disseminat-
ing written information in a faster and easier way made
possible the circulation of falsehood too.
Hence, the advent of new means of communication,
increased the presence of deliberated false content, not
always with harmful purposes. In this regard, one of the
greatest examples of misinformation of our times was
the radio broadcast of The War of the Worlds directed
by Orson Welles on October 30th, 1938. That radio show
was followed by thousands of listeners, and some of
them believed that the Earth was under an alien attack,
thanks to the narration of Welles’ cast (Gorbach, 2018).
This radio show wanted to entertain the audience
using an alteration of reality. However, manipulation of
the truth has been used as a weapon in military conflicts
over the centuries in order to ascribe malicious acts or
characteristics to the enemy (Bloch, 1999, p. 182). A good
example of this use of misinformation was the sequence
of news published after the explosion in the boilers of
the United States Navy ship USS Maine on February 15th,
1898. In the middle of the fight for being the most read
against Joseph Pulitzer’s The New York World, William
Randolph Hearst, editor of the New York Journal, sent a
journalist to Cuba with the objective of telling the read-
ers the details of a Spanish attack to this ship. Thus, when
the correspondent arrived at the island reported that
alleged attack did not exist. Nonetheless, the newspaper
published a series of stories detailing the attack—even
when they knew they were not accurate—causing a cli-
mate of hate against Spain and acceptance of the coming
war. Finally, The United States declared the war against
Spain (Amorós, 2018, p. 34). After this conflict, misinfor-
mation continued to be used against the enemy in war
times. Thus, it is possible to identify strategies of its use
in recent conflicts like the World War I and World War II,
the Vietnam War or the Gulf War (Peters, 2018).
2.2. Fake News as a Threat to Journalism
Falsity has cast a shadow over the discipline of commu-
nication throughout history. One of the newest forms
of misinformation is fake news, pieces that imitate the
appearance of journalistic information, but deliberately
altered (Rochlin, 2017). This form of deception has coex-
isted with true news. However, the current communica-
tive scenario, marked by the utilisation of high speed and
low contrast means of communication—and among all
social media—provides a fertile soil for the dissemina-
tion of any form of misinformation (Lazer et al., 2018).
Platforms like Facebook or Twitter are now among
the primary news sources for Internet users (Bergström
& Jervelycke-Belfrage, 2018). Fake news producers are
aware of this fact. As a result, they have made the web
the main channel for false content distribution, taking
advantage of the possibility of communicating anony-
mously provided by certain spaces (Vosoughi, Roy, &
Aral, 2018). Furthermore, fake news producers have
the chance of reaching as large audiences as consol-
idated journalistic brands (Fletcher, Cornia, Graves, &
Nielsen, 2018), which makes the verification of this fal-
sities more difficult.
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During the last few years, there have been differ-
ent proposals for classifying fake news. Among them,
the one developed by Tandoc, Lim, and Ling (2018)
is perhaps the most exhaustive: news satire, a very
common form of fake news with a large presence in
magazines, websites and radio or TV shows; news par-
ody, which shares some of the characteristics of news
satire, but it is not based on topical issues. These
pieces are fictional elements specifically produced for
certain purposes; news fabrication, unfounded stories
that try to imitate the structure of news published by
legacy media. The promoters of these pieces try to
deceive by blending them among the truthful ones;
photo manipulation—alteration of images—and more
recently videos—for building a different reality; adver-
tising and public relations—dissemination of advertis-
ing by masking it to look as journalistic reporting; and
propaganda—stories from political organizations with
the objective of influencing citizens’ opinion on them.
Like some of the previous ones, they imitate the formal
structure of news pieces.
Regarding its formal structure, fake news try to imi-
tate news items’ formal appearance. Thus, visual codes
and elements like headlines, images, videos hypertext
and texts conceived like journalistic pieces are common
features of this misinformation strategies (Amorós, 2018,
p. 65). Nonetheless, its major particularity is that fake
news tries to attack the readers’ previous opinion, espe-
cially on controversial issues related to racism, xeno-
phobia, homophobia and other forms of hate (Bennett
& Livingston, 2018; Waisbord, 2018). This connection
makes possible the rapid replication of such content
thanks to the ease of sharing through spaces like social
media platforms. Thus, episodes like electoral processes
(Lowrey, 2017), or more recently the Covid-19 pandemic
(Salaverría et al., 2020; Shimizu, 2020), resulted in a
deep growth of fake news circulation, at times using sim-
ple methods but at times taking advance of the most
advanced technology.
2.3. Deepfake: A Novel Form of Fake News
Deepfakes, a combination of ‘deep learning’ and ‘fake’
(Westerlund, 2019), are “highly realistic and difficult-to-
detect digital manipulations of audio or video” (Chesney
& Citron, 2019). It can be defined as “a technique used
to manipulate videos using computer code” (Fernandes
et al., 2019, p. 1721), generally replacing the voice or the
face of a person with the face of the voice of another per-
son. Although the photo and video manipulation have
existed for a long time, the use of artificial intelligence
methods for these purposes has augmented the number
of fakes and its quality. Some of these videos are humor-
ous, but the majority of them are damaging (Maras &
Alexandrou, 2019). Hence, this is a recent movement
whose beginnings date back to 2017, starting then a
rapid popularisation until now (Deeptrace Labs, 2018,
pp. 2–4).
This technique is the result of using Generative
Adversarial Networks, algorithms designed to replace
human faces or voices in thousands of images and videos
in order to make them as realistic as possible (Li, Chang,
& Lyu, 2018). The main advantage of these algorithms
is that these systems are learning how to improve them-
selves by creating deepfakes. Therefore, future creations
will be improved thanks to past experiences. This fea-
ture makes this misinformation procedure more danger-
ous, especially due to the emergence of mobile apps
and computer programmes that allow users without
computer programming training to produce deepfakes
(Nirkin, Keller, & Hassner, 2019; Schwartz, 2018).
Farid et al. (2019, pp. 4–6) tried to label the different
forms adopted by deepfakes in four categories: 1) face
replacement or face swapping—this method involves
changing one person’s face, the source, for another one,
the target; 2) face re-enactment—manipulation of the
features of the features of one person’s face like the
movement of the mouth or the eyes, among others;
3) face generation—creation of a completely new face
using all the potential provided by Generative Adversarial
Networks; and 4) speech synthesis—alteration of some-
one’s discourse in terms of cadence and intonation, or
generation of a completely new one.
As with other technologies, the same algorithms
used for creating deepfakes could have a beneficial appli-
cation in the field of psychology, building digital syn-
thetic identities for voiceless users; or in robot sketches
through advanced facial recognition for law enforce-
ment, for example (Akhtar & Dasgupta, 2019; Zhu, Fang,
Sui, & Li, 2020). Notwithstanding, its use seems to be
more harmful than beneficial nowadays with examples
of the use of these technologies in acts of fraud and
crime (Stupp, 2019).
Hence, one of the biggest challenges of deepfakes is
to find out how to counteract them knowing that the
debunking methods’ development is always late regard-
ing the production of misinformation (Galston, 2020).
However, a great deal of effort has been made—and
is still made—to develop technology-based tools for
detecting and correcting it, both from public and private
organizations (Deeptrace Labs, 2018, p. 2). These tools
will be helpful in almost all areas of communication, espe-
cially for journalism.
2.4. Fact-Checking: Journalism’s Response to the
Misinformation Wave
In light of the above, verified information seems to
be a necessity in our communicative context (Ekström,
Lewis, & Westlund, 2020), especially because disruptive
episodes like the coronavirus outbreak resulted in a clear
increase of citizens’ informative consumption (Masip
et al., 2020). Furthermore, political communication has
shifted to a model in which political leaders share their
messages online instead of doing it through traditional
media (López-García & Pavía, 2019).
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At this juncture, the media has increased the impor-
tance of verification processes for correcting both inter-
nal and external errors (Geham, 2017). Consequently,
a new professional profile—the fact-checker—has
emerged with the mission of debunking misinformation
and prevent audiences of its consumption. These profes-
sionals try to go to the origin of an information or a claim
for gathering all the available data and contrasting it
(Graves, 2016, p. 110). Fortunately, journalists have also
benefited from the development of new technological
tools designed for verifying images, videos or websites in
an efficient manner (Brandtzaeg, Lüders, Spangenberg,
Rath-Wiggins, & Følstad, 2016).
Although verification has always been part of any
journalistic process, the rapid growth of the fake news
phenomenon over the past few years made this activity
more important than ever. Thus, the census created by
the University of Duke Reporters’ Lab counts now almost
300 fact-checkers in more than 60 countries by the by
middle of 2020, a hundred more than on the same date
in 2019 (Stencel & Luther, 2020). Regarding this, it is pos-
sible to talk about fact-checking as a transnational move-
ment (Graves, 2018) were both legacy and independent
media organizations try to restore the trust lost by the
media (Bennett & Livingston, 2018).
3. Method
The starting point of this research will be the appli-
cation of the Systematic Literature Review method
(Kitchenham, 2004) as a method to set an approach on
how deepfakes are being addressed and studied. Due
to the novelty of this reality, this method will let us
understand in an exhaustive way (Codina, 2017) what are
researchers doing to assess this phenomenon and what
efforts are being done to stop its spread.
Hence, our method consisted in the following phases:
1) topic identification—‘deepfake’ and ‘deep fake’—
and the period of analysis—all the available literature;
2) source selection—Web of Science’s SCI-Expanded,
SSCI, CPCI-S, CPI-SS, CPCI-SSH, and Scopus; 3) search in
databases—the selection of Web of Science and Scopus
is justified by the importance of these two databases,
which contain the most relevant contributions for the
Social Sciences field in general and deepfakes specifi-
cally; and 4) identification of the studied variables for
each item—descriptive data (article title, date, jour-
nal or conference, number of authors, and keywords),
type of study, research techniques (observation, survey,
interview, content analysis, case study, experimental or
non-specified), principal contribution, DOI or URL, and
institution and country.
This search resulted in 54 different research items:
28 presented at international conferences and 26 pub-
lished in academic journals—all of that after deleting
duplicities and texts that did not fit the criteria, such as
editorial articles, call for papers, or interviews, among
others. These 54 examples comprise our sample that will
be addressed in the next section in order to understand
the path followed by researchers on this subject.
Concerning the second stage of our study, it
will analyse the approach taken by three renowned
media outlets and news agencies—TheWashington Post,
The Wall Street Journal, and Reuters—and three of the
most important Internet platforms—Google, Facebook
and Twitter—in neutralizing the spread of deepfakes.
Thus, case study of these six organizations will be
applied in order to understand how they are managing
to identify, label and notify deepfakes through differ-
ent approaches—protocols, use of technology, collabora-
tion with institutions, and funding of innovative projects.
This will be done through the analysis of the available
reports and statements of these six organizations.
Consequently, the main goal of our study will be
to identify the coincidences and disparities in the strat-
egy of three major media outlets and three of the most
important online platforms when trying to stop the diffu-
sion of deepfakes. This will be relevant in order to under-
stand if six of the main representatives from these two
communicative fields are joining efforts and strategies
in limiting or not its spread, and how these procedures
could be improved.
4. Findings
4.1. Results of the Systematic Literature Review
We will start by depicting the state of the research
on deepfakes, especially the contributions indexed in
the two main databases—Web of Science and Scopus.
As shown in Table 1, research about this issue started
in 2018 with four conference papers. However, it was
quintupled in 2019, and during the first half of 2020
almost a half more of works on deepfakes than the
previous year were published. Furthermore, the most
salient element of this table is that this form of fake
news used to have presence at conferences, but in
2020 they become a topic addressed in academic jour-
nals too. Nonetheless, it is necessary to note that
the situation resulting from the Covid-19 pandemic
Table 1. Evolution of the studies on deepfake indexed in WoS and Scopus.
Year Conference paper Journal article Total
2018 4 0 4
2019 16 5 21
2020 (1st half) 8 21 29
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has provoked the cancellation or postponement of
many conferences.
Regarding the authorship of this research, the most
common approach is the participation of three authors.
Thus, the arithmetic mean—3,13 authors—and the
mode—14 articles have three authors—serve to confirm
this. Also concerning the authorship, researchers from
24 countries were identified, most of them located in the
United States and Asia—China, Japan, South Korea, India,
or Taiwan.
Finally, this review shows a large degree of unifor-
mity concerning the type of studies published on deep-
fakes. Almost all the reviewed articles and conference
papers take a descriptive approach. This is because 32
of the items are the result of experimenting with new
tools and algorithms to counteract it. Another important
group of research is review articles on deepfake detec-
tion and prevention or even about legal framework and
legal concerns of this form of misinformation, something
that was found 21 times.
In sum, the novelty of deepfake implies a certain
degree of youth for its research. At present, it is possi-
ble to see two trends: Studies that present new forms to
stop its spread, or studies that try to create context on
its emergence and development.
4.2. Counteracting Deepfakes at The Wall Street Journal,
The Washington Post and Reuters
Recent advances in artificial intelligence and their
democratisation have allowed average users to create
deepfakes. This represents a major challenge for our soci-
ety due to the potential harmful impact of these cre-
ations, especially before electoral processes. Looking to
the United States 2020 general election, The Wall Street
Journal has created a division of 21 journalists whose
unique objective is detecting, labelling and debunking
misinformation, particularly deepfakes (Southern, 2019).
This team is a joint effort of Standards & Ethics and
R&D departments, and this work is very linked to the
use of technology with presence of journalist with video,
photo, visuals, research and news experience that have
been trained for deepfake detection (Marconi & Daldrup,
2018). Furthermore, The Wall Street Journal provides
specialized training in fake news and deepfake identi-
fication in partnership with different researchers. This
has led to the development of a protocol to find exam-
ples of this kind of misinformation with three stages:
source examination (contact with the source, author-
ship identification, and metadata check, among others),
search for older versions of the footage available online,
and footage examination with video and photo edit-
ing programs.
Meanwhile, The Washington Post has applied to
deepfake detection very similar criteria to other fake
news detection. Thus, the The Washington Post has
added video experts to the tasks developed by the
team led by Glenn Kessler—also known as ‘The Fact
Checker’ (Kessler, 2019). The most important contribu-
tion of this publication regarding this problem is the elab-
oration of a taxonomy to classify and label deepfakes.
The Washington Post was also pioneering in the use of
scales to highlight the degree of truth and lie of any
content. Regarding doctored videos, the newspaper sets
out three categories of manipulation (Ajaka, Samuels, &
Kessler, 2019): missing context (presentation of the video
without context or with a context intentionally altered),
deceptive editing (rearrangement and edition of the
video in certain parts or details), and malicious transfor-
mation (complete manipulation and transformation of
the footage resulting in a completely new fabrication).
A third approach to this reality could be the one
adopted by the news agency Reuters. The news services
provider reports its awareness and concern on the deep-
fake spread (Crosse, n.d.). Hence, it has started a collab-
oration with Facebook for detecting as much doctored
user-generated content as possible among all the videos
and photos that run on the platform (Patadia, 2020).
In this regard, Reuters has started a blog whose objec-
tive is verifying doctored materials in English and Spanish.
All of that with the objective of debunking as much infor-
mation as possible ahead of the 2020 United States elec-
tion. This is a clear example of the emerging collabo-
ration among technological platforms and the media, a
joint effort in trying to stop the rapid growth of fake news
and deepfakes in such significant moments like a presi-
dential run-up.
4.3. Internet Giants’ Strategies Against Deepfakes
The spread of falsehood through social media plat-
forms and other Internet spaces is now a challenge for
providers like Google, Facebook or Twitter. As a result,
over the last few months they have started different
initiatives whose unique objective is finding efficient
ways to detect and stop the misinformation and, more
recently, deepfakes.
Regarding this, these three companies show differ-
ent approaches against this matter. Google, for instance,
has made available to the research community a large
set of manipulated and non-manipulated videos (Dufour
& Gully, 2019). With this initiative, they want to help in
the development of identification techniques by taking
advantage of the great amount of information saved in
their files. In addition, they collaborate with the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency to fund different
researchers that are developing media forensic tools.
On the other hand, Facebook is financing differ-
ent research projects within its ‘Deepfake Detection
Challenge.’ This initiative, boosted by companies like
Facebook, Microsoft and Amazon Web Services and
research units from various universities across the
United States, tries to assist researchers that are work-
ing on the development of artificial intelligence-based
deepfake detection tools. Thus, a corpus of more than
100,000 videos was available to these researchers that
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fight for presenting useful mechanism in order to win dif-
ferent awards.
Furthermore, Mark Zuckerberg’s social network tries
to counteract this form of misinformation by deleting
doctored videos or photos, or labelling it as fake news
with the help of fact-checking media outlets (Bickert,
2020). This is particularly important for those related to
the 2020 United States run-up due to the influence that
fake news could have in this process.
Finally, Twitter shows a simpler approach towards
this problem. They summarize their strategy in the fol-
lowing four rules (Harvey, 2019): Identification through a
notice of Tweets with manipulated content, warning of
its manipulated condition before sharing it, inclusion of
a link to news articles or other verified sources in which
users can find out why and how the content has been doc-
tored, and elimination of all that manipulated content
potentially harmful or threatening to anyone’s safety.
These diverging strategies on behalf of the major
online platforms are in part the product of self-regulated
methods for fighting deepfakes, as there is still incipient
intervention on behalf of the states in regulating con-
tent on social media and other outlets. The question to
be asked here is whether it is the online platforms’ sole
responsibility to tackle misinformation or if there are any
social interests in this situation for which other public
entities should allocate resources to.
The European Commission already pointed out in
2018 the need for governments to invest in research
and detection of misinformation, while also prompt-
ing these to hold social media companies account-
able (European Commission, 2018). So far, in the last
two years the EU has launched a series of initiatives
to tackle the issue: a code of practice against dis-
information, the creation of the Social Observatory
for Disinformation and Social Media Analysis and the
set-up of the Rapid Alert System, among other R&D
projects such as PROVENANCE, SocialTruth, EUNOMIA
or WeVerify (European Commission, 2020). Despite a
lot of efforts being made to avoid the spread of mis-
information in the EU, deepfakes are still not as much
on the agenda as other academics are asking for, while
also describing their worry for seemingly understaffed
programs (Bressnan, 2019). Measures taken by coun-
tries to prompt social media companies in acting against
fake news contain different levels of intervention and
are mainly dedicated to counteracting disinformation in
political advertisement. France and Germany, for exam-
ple, require online platforms to establish an easily acces-
sible and visible way for users to flag false information,
while Australia requires all paid electoral advertising,
including advertisements on social media, to be autho-
rized and to contain an authorization statement (Levush,
2019). In the United States, some states have already
taken specific measures to counter deepfakes, although
these are still merely reactive and not preventive, such
as Texas passing a law that criminalizes publishing and
distributing deepfake videos with the intention to harm
a candidate during the electoral process; or California,
where a law was passed last October making it illegal for
anyone to intentionally distribute deepfakes for deceiv-
ing voters or perjure a candidate (Castro, 2020).
The implications of these incipient interactions
between governments and social media companies
might have relevant governance questions in the forth-
coming years, all the while these companies are also
starting to take new approaches to their governance
structures, such is the case of the Facebook, who set up
the Independent Oversight Board, which “aims to make
Facebook more accountable and improve the decision-
making process,” in the words of Nick Clegg, currently
Facebook’s VP of Global Affairs and Communications and
former Deputy Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
(Moltzau, 2020).
5. Discussion
As shown in the previous section, the media and Internet
platforms have initiated different strategies to fight mis-
information and, more particularly, the spread of deep-
fakes. In this regard, there are some similarities and dif-
ferences among the strategies of these two communica-
tive sectors.
First of all, it seems clear that the collaboration
among platforms and media outlets increases over time.
Example of this could be the agreements among Reuters
and Facebook whose objective is to detect fake news and
share its correction. Furthermore, other fact-checking
organizations collaborate with this social network in
labelling false content and warn users about this.
Another coincidence is the use of technology as
a weapon in the battle against deepfakes. Both news
media and digital platforms have understood that high
technology and the use of algorithms as powerful as
those used for creating fakes is the only chance to coun-
teract them. Thus, media outlets are increasingly train-
ing journalists and interdisciplinary teams in the use of
these mechanisms that allow them to identify this form
of misinformation.
The third match could be the growing synergies
between the academic and communicative sides. Thus,
media outlets and platforms try to collaborate with
researchers and institutions specialized in fake news
detection, both in training and to apply their methods.
Regarding the divergences when dealing deepfakes,
online platforms are able to fund research projects
whose objective is developing artificial intelligence-tools
for identifying this form of fake news. The media, how-
ever, does not have such possibilities due to the expen-
diture of these activities.
Another difference in dealing with this issue could
be that the media use to correct misinformation instead
deleting it. As shown before, some of the social media
platforms have the elimination of doctored content
among their strategies. This presents a clear challenge.
Although deleting manipulated videos or photos ends
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with the problem for future or potential users, does not
for those users that have seen them. In contrast, labelling
these materials as false or manipulated—the approach
followed by verification media outlets—could be helpful
for future users.
6. Conclusions
Deepfakes have become a reality in our communicative
system. Media outlets and Internet services providers try
to counteract it with different outlooks. However, the
development of the techniques for producing misinfor-
mation seems to advance faster than those for debunk-
ing it. Regarding this, the available research is mainly
focused on two aspects: On one hand detection tools,
and on the other hand, the implications of this form of
fake news for democracy and national security. The fact
that so far only big technological giants are capable of
introducing hi-tech expensive solutions for fighting deep-
fakes motivates that the available mass of research on
the subject is fundamentally dedicated to address the
questions raised by these corporations which are mainly
technological. On the other hand, journalism focused
media, which are not able to invest large amounts of
money on deepfake detection are therefore unable to
push their concerns into the research agenda. For this
reason, producing research on the implications of deep-
fakes for journalism and under journalistic premises
presents itself as elemental, as well as further investiga-
tion on how the media trains its professionals for detect-
ing advanced misinformation.
The novelty of this deceiving technique provokes
its understudied situation, but the constant growth of
works on this matter show that it will be an important
field for researchers on misinformation and media foren-
sics in the following years. However, the study is able
to show to some extent that the media and digital plat-
forms’ have notable similarities and differences when it
comes to their strategies. This could be due to the dif-
ferent nature of their business models, but neverthe-
less sometimes it seems to be a matter of investment.
Digital platforms have joined efforts with technological,
academic or entrepreneurial partners, spending large
amounts of money in this field, which is something that
many media outlets cannot accomplish.
However, these collaborations go in some cases
beyond the private sector. The growing pressure on
behalf of states and governments, pushing for different
levels of regulation for these social media companies is
being noted around the world. Countries have started
to put mechanisms in place that allow for a more scru-
tinized assessment of these corporations, since there
is an increasingly wider knowledge on how their inner
social interaction tools can affect basic democratic ele-
ments (elections, political advertisement, etc.). A repre-
sentative example of this is Facebook’s recent signing of
Nick Clegg, former Deputy Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom, in a move that seems to state its willingness
to reform its governance structures towards more state-
sensible policies. The tendency seems to describe a ten-
sion between the states and governments’ purpose to
regulate, and the effort of these companies to maintain
their self-regulation.
Nonetheless, it is necessary to highlight the limita-
tions of our study and our sample. As the reader may
have noticed, our sample shows a western-oriented cul-
tural bias, both for the media and digital platforms analy-
sis. This could make it difficult to generalize our findings
to similar organizations from other territories. However,
this research presents a descriptive approach whose
objective is to analyse how major communication com-
panies are trying to counteract the spread of deepfakes,
the most novel and hi-tech-based form of misinforma-
tion. Furthermore, the novelty and high level of sophisti-
cation of this new way of producing fake news requires
a similar level of human and technological resources
for the debunking process, something that only large
companies—mainly United States-based—can afford at
this particular time. In the future, it will be interesting
to follow the progress of both deepfakes production and
identification strategies as well as the paths adopted by
researchers in this subject. As mentioned, this is a recent
phenomenon, but its rapid growth will make necessary
the setting up of protocols for containing its spread in
both media outlets and online platforms.
Future lines of research regarding this topic might
include a deep assessment of how journalists perceive
deepfakes in their daily routines, and the challenge of
verification for journalists, which includes questions of
technological literacy and guides for good practices.
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